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Stonewall
Jackson in the Civil War
Stonewall Jackson Free Online Books |
Stonewall Jackson in Civil War |
Stonewall Jackson Biography |
Stonewall Jackson Obituary |
Stonewall Jackson's Last Words |
Stonewall Jackson Birthday |
Stonewall Jackson Quotes
STONEWALL JACKSON Chapter II MEXICO1
Stonewall Jackson Index |
Stonewall Jackson at West Point |
Stonewall Jackson and Mexican War |
Stonewall Jackson Lexington |
Stonewall Jackson and Secession |
Stonewall Jackson and Harper's Ferry |
Stonewall Jackson at Battle of Bull Run |
Stonewall Jackson at Romney |
Stonewall Jackson at Kernstown |
Battle of McDowell |
Battle of Winchester |
Battle of Cross Keys and Port Republic |
Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign |
The Seven Days Battle |
Battle of Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill |
Battle of Cedar Run |
Second Battle of Bull Run |
Battle of Second Bull Run Conclusion |
Battle of Harper's Ferry |
Battle of Sharpsburg |
Battle of Fredericksburg |
The Army of Northern Virginia |
Stonewall Jackson's Winter Quarters |
Battle of Chancellorsville |
Battle of Chancellorsville Conclusion
1846 On June 30, 1846, Jackson received the brevet rank of
second lieutenant of artillery. He was fortunate from the very
outset of his military career. The officers of the United States
army, thanks to the thorough education and Spartan discipline of
West Point, were fine soldiers; but their scope was limited. On the
western frontier, far beyond the confines of civilisation, stood a
long line of forts, often hundreds of miles apart, garrisoned by a
few troops of cavalry or companies of infantry. It is true that
there was little chance of soldierly capacity rusting in these
solitary posts. From the borders of Canada to the banks of the Rio
Grande swarmed thousands of savage warriors, ever watchful for an
opportunity to pay back with bloody interest the aggression of the
whites. Murder, robbery, and massacre followed each other in rapid
succession, and the troops were allowed few intervals of rest. But
the warfare was inglorious—a mere series of petty incidents, the
punishment of a raid, or the crushing of an isolated revolt. The
scanty butcher’s bills of the so-called battles made small appeal to
the popular imagination, and the deeds of the soldiers in the
western wilderness, gallant as they might be, aroused less interest
in the States than the conflicts of the police with the New York
mob. But although pursuits which carried the adversaries half across
the continent, forays which were of longer duration than a European
war, and fights against overwhelming odds, where no quarter was
asked or given, kept the American officers constantly employed,
their 1
Copyright 1897 by Longmans, Green, & Co.
FRONTIER WARFARE 25
training was hardly sufficient for the needs of a great campaign. In
the running fights against
Apache or Blackfoot the rules of
strategy and tactics were of small account. The soldier was
constrained to acknowledge the brave and the trapper as his
teachers; and Moltke himself, with all his lore, would have been
utterly baffled by the cunning of the Indian. Before the war of
1845–6 the strength of the regular army was not more than 8,500 men;
and the whole of this force, with the exception of a few batteries,
was scattered in small detachments along the frontier. The troops
were never brought together in considerable bodies; and although
they were well drilled and under the strictest discipline, neither
the commanders nor the staff had the least experience of handling
men in masses. Many of the infantry officers had never drilled with
a whole battalion since they left West Point. A brigade of
cavalry—that is, two or three regiments working together as a single
unit—had never been assembled; and scarcely a single general had
ever commanded a force composed of the three arms, either on service
or on parade. “During my twenty years of service on the frontier,”
said one of the most famous of the Confederate leaders,1
“I learned all about commanding fifty United States dragoons and
forgot everything else.”
Nevertheless, this life of enterprise and hard work, the constant
struggle against nature, for the illimitable space of the
inhospitable wilderness was a more formidable antagonist than the
stealthy savage, benefited the American soldier in more ways than
one. He grew accustomed to danger and privation. He learned to use
his wits; to adapt his means to his end; to depend on his
intelligence rather than on rule. Above all, even the most junior
had experience of independent command before the enemy. A ready
assumption of responsibility and a prompt initiative distinguished
the regular officers from the very outset of the Civil War; and
these characteristics had been acquired on the western prairies.
But the warfare of the frontier had none of the glamour
1 General R. S. Ewell.
FRONTIER WARFARE 26
of the warfare which is waged with equal arms against an equal
enemy, of the conflict of nation against nation. To bring the foe to
bay was a matter of the utmost difficulty. A fight at close quarters
was of rare occurrence, and the most successful campaign ended in
the destruction of a cluster of dirty wigwams, or the surrender of a
handful of starving savages. In such unsatisfactory service Jackson
was not called upon to take a part. It is doubtful if he ever
crossed the Mississippi. His first experience of campaigning was to
be on a field where gleams of glory were not wanting. The ink on his
commission was scarcely dry when the artillery subaltern was ordered
to join his regiment, the First Artillery, in
Mexico. The war with the Southern
Republic had blazed out on the Texan border in 1845, and the
American Government had now decided to carry it into the heart of
the hostile territory. With the cause of quarrel we have no concern.
General Grant has
condemned the war as “one of the most unjust ever waged by a
stronger against a weaker nation.”1 Be this as it may, it
is doubtful whether any of Grant’s brother officers troubled
themselves at all with the equity of invasion. It was enough for
them that the expedition meant a struggle with a numerous enemy,
armed and organised on the European model, and with much experience
of war; that it promised a campaign in a country which was the very
region of romance, possessing a lovely climate, historic cities, and
magnificent scenery. The genius of Prescott had just disentombed
from dusty archives the marvellous story of the Spanish conquest,
and the imagination of many a youthful soldier had been already
kindled by his glowing pages. To follow the path of
Cortez, to
traverse the golden realms of Montezuma, to look upon the lakes and
palaces of Mexico, the most ancient city of America, to encamp among
the temples of a vanished race, and to hear, while the fireflies
flitted through the perfumed night, the music of the black-eyed
maidens of New Spain—was ever more fascinating prospect offered to a
subaltern of two-and-twenty? The
companies of the First Artillery which had been
1 Grant’s Memoirs, vol. i, p. 53.
ACTIVE SERVICE 27
detailed for foreign service were first transferred to
Point Isabel, at the
mouth of the Rio Grande. Several engagements had already taken
place.
Palo Alto,
Resaca de la Palma, and
Monterey were brilliant American victories, won by hard fighting
over superior numbers; and a vast extent of territory had been
overrun. But the Mexicans were still unconquered. The provinces they
had lost were but the fringe of the national domains; the heart of
the Republic had not yet felt the pressure of war, and more than six
hundred miles of difficult country intervened between the invaders
and the capital. The American proposals for peace had been summarily
rejected. A new President,
General Santa Anna, had been
raised to power, and under his vigorous administration the war
threatened to assume a phase sufficiently embarrassing to the United
States. Jackson had been attached
to a heavy battery, and his first duty was to transport guns and
mortars to the forts which protected
Point Isabel. The
prospect of immediate employment before the enemy was small.
Operations had come to a standstill. It was already apparent that a
direct advance upon the capital, through the northern provinces, was
an enterprise which would demand an army much larger than the
Government was disposed to furnish. It seemed as if the First
Artillery had come too late. Jackson was fearful that the war might
come to an end before his regiment should be sent to the front. The
shy cadet had a decided taste for fighting. “I envy you men,” he
said to a comrade more fortunate than himself,1 “who have
been in battle. How I should like to be in one battle!” His
longing for action was soon gratified. Mexico had no navy and a long
sea-board. The fleet of the United States was strong, their maritime
resources ample, and to land an army on a shorter route to the
distant capital was no difficult undertaking.
General Winfield Scott, who
had been sent out as commander-in-chief, was permitted, early in 1847, to
organise a combined naval and military expedition for the reduction of
Vera Cruz, the principal
port of the Republic, 1
Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards his brother-in-law.
ACTIVE SERVICE 28
whence a good road leads to Mexico. The line of advance would be
thus reduced to two hundred and sixty miles; and the natural
obstacles, though numerous enough, were far less serious than the
deserts which barred invasion from the north.
1847 For this enterprise most of the regular regiments were
withdrawn from the Rio Grande; and
General
Taylor, the hero of Palo Alto and Monterey, was left with a
small army, composed principally of volunteers, to hold the
conquered provinces. Scott’s troops assembled in the first instance
at Tampico. The transports, eighty in number, having embarked their
freight, were directed to rendezvous in the road stead of Lobos, one
hundred and twenty miles north of
Vera Cruz; and when the
whole had assembled, the fleet set sail for Los Sacrificios, the
island where Cortez had landed in 1520, three miles south of the
city. The army of invasion, in which the First Regiment of Artillery
was included, consisted of 13,000 men.
March 9 On the morning of March 9 the sun shone propitiously
on the expedition. The surf-boats, each holding from seventy to
eighty men, were quickly arrayed in line. Then, dashing forward
simultaneously, with the strains of martial music sweeping over the
smooth waters of the bay, they neared the shore. The landing was
covered by seven armed vessels, and as the boats touched the beach
the foremost men leaped into the water and ran up the sandy shore.
In one hour
General Worth’s
division, numbering 4,500 men, was disembarked; and by the same
precise arrangements the whole army was landed in six hours without
accident or confusion. To the astonishment of the Americans the
enemy offered no resistance, and the troops bivouacked in line of
battle on the beach. Little more
than a mile north, across a waste of sand-hills, rose the white
walls of Vera Cruz. The city was held by 4,000 men, and its armament
was formidable. The troops, however, but partially organised, were
incapable of operations in the open field. The garrison had not been
reinforced. Santa Anna, on learning that the American army on the
Rio Grande had been reduced, had acted with
FALL OF VERA CRUZ 29
commendable promptitude. Collecting all the troops that were
available he had marched northwards, expecting, doubtless, to
overwhelm Taylor and still to be in time to prevent Scott from
seizing a good harbour. But distance was against him, and his
precautions were inadequate. Even if he defeated Taylor, he would
have to march more than a thousand miles to encounter Scott, and
Vera Cruz was ill provided for a siege. It was difficult, it is
true, for the Mexican general to anticipate the point at which the
Americans would disembark. An army that moves by sea possesses the
advantage that its movements are completely veiled. But Vera Cruz
was decidedly the most probable objective of the invaders, and, had
it been made secure, the venture of the Americans would have been
rendered hazardous. As it was, with Santa Anna’s army far away, the
reduction of the fortress presented little difficulty. An immediate
assault would in all likelihood have proved successful. Scott,
however, decided on a regular siege. His army was small, and a march
on the capital was in prospect. The Government grudged both men and
money, and an assault would have cost more lives than could well be
spared. On March 18 the trenches were completed. Four days later,
sufficient heavy ordnance having been landed, the bombardment was
begun. March
27 On the 27th the town surrendered; the garrison laid down
their arms, and 400 cannon, many of large calibre, fell into the
hands of the Americans. The fall
of Vera Cruz was brought about by the heavy artillery, aided by the
sailors, and the First Regiment was continuously engaged. The
Mexican fire, notwithstanding their array of guns, was comparatively
harmless. The garrison attempted no sortie; and only 64 of the
investing force were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, Jackson's
behaviour under fire attracted notice, and a few months later he was
promoted to first lieutenant “for gallant and meritorious conduct at
the siege of Vera Cruz.”1
1 He had been promoted second lieutenant on March 3.
Records of the First Regiment of Artillery.
BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 30
Scott had now secured an admirable line of operations; but the
projected march upon the city of Mexico was a far more arduous
undertaking than the capture of the port. The ancient capital of
Montezuma stands high above the sea. The famous valley which
surrounds it is embosomed in the heart of a vast plateau, and the
roads which lead to this lofty region wind by steep gradients over
successive ranges of rugged and precipitous mountains. Between Vera
Cruz and the upland lies a level plain, sixty miles broad, and
covered with tropical forest. Had it been possible to follow up the
initial victory by a rapid advance,
Cerro Gordo, the first,
and the most difficult, of the mountain passes, might have been
occupied without a blow.
Santa Anna, defeated by
Taylor at
Buena Vista, but
returning hot foot to block Scott’s path, was still distant, and
Cerro Gordo was undefended. But the progress of the Americans was
arrested by the difficulties inherent in all maritime expeditions.
An army landing on a hostile coast has to endure a certain period of
inactivity. Under ordinary circumstances, as at Vera Cruz, the
process of disembarking men is rapidly accomplished. The field-guns
follow with but little delay, and a certain proportion of cavalry
becomes early available. But the disembarkation of the
impedimenta—the stores, waggons, hospitals, ammunition, and
transport animals—even where ample facilities exist, demands far
more time than the disembarkation of the fighting force. In the
present case, as all the animals had to be requisitioned in the
country, it was not till the middle of April that supplies and
transport sufficient to warrant further movement had been
accumulated; and meanwhile General Santa Anna, halting in the
mountains, had occupied the pass of Cerro Gordo with 13,000 men and
42 pieces of artillery. The Mexican position was exceedingly strong.
The right rested on a deep ravine, with precipitous cliffs; the
left, on the hill of Cerro Gordo, covered with batteries, and
towering to the height of several hundred feet above the surrounding
ridges; while the front, strongly intrenched, and commanding the
BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 31
road which wound zigzag fashion up the steep ascent, followed the
crest of a lofty ridge. The
Americans reached the foot of the pass without difficulty. The enemy
had made no attempt to check their passage through the forest.
Confident in the inaccessibility of his mountain crags, in his
numerous guns and massive breastworks, Santa Anna reserved his
strength for battle on ground of his own selection.
Several days were consumed in reconnaissance. The engineers, to whom
this duty was generally assigned in the American army, pushed their
explorations to either flank. At length the quick eye of a young
officer, Captain Robert Lee, already noted for his services at Vera
Cruz, discovered a line of approach, hidden from the enemy, by which
the position might be turned. In three days a rough road was
constructed by which guns could be brought to bear on the hill of
Cerro Gordo, and infantry marched round to strike the Mexicans in
rear. April
18 The attack, delivered at daylight on April 18, was
brilliantly successful. The enemy was completely surprised. Cerro
Gordo was stormed with the bayonet, and Santa Anna’s right,
assaulted from a direction whence he confessed that he had not
believed a goat could approach his lines, was rolled back in
confusion on his centre. 1,200 Mexicans were killed and wounded, and
3,000 captured, together with the whole of their artillery.1
The next day the pursuit was pushed with uncompromising resolution.
Amidst pathless mountains, 6,000 feet above the sea, where every
spur formed a strong position, the defeated army was permitted
neither halt nor respite. The American dragoons, undeterred by
numbers, pressed forward along the road, making hundreds of
prisoners, and spreading panic in the broken ranks.
May 15 The infantry followed, sturdily breasting the long
ascent; a second intrenched position, barring the La Hoya pass, was
abandoned on their approach; the strong castle of Perote, with an
armament of 60 guns and mortars, opened its gates without firing a
shot, 1 The
Americans had about 8,500 men upon the field, and their loss was
431, including two generals. Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott.
MAGRUDER'S BATTERY 32
and on May 15 the great city of Puebla, surrounded by glens of
astonishing fertility, and only eighty miles from Mexico, was
occupied without resistance. At
Cerro Gordo the First Artillery were employed as infantry. Their
colours were amongst the first to be planted on the enemy’s
breastworks. But in none of the reports does Jackson’s name occur.1
The battle, however, brought him good luck. Captain Magruder, an
officer of his own regiment, who was to win distinction on wider
fields, had captured a Mexican field battery, which Scott presented
to him as a reward for his gallantry. Indian wars had done but
little towards teaching American soldiers the true use of artillery.
Against a rapidly moving enemy, who systematically forebore exposing
himself in mass, and in a country where no roads existed, only the
fire-arm was effective. But already, at Palo Alto and Resaca,
against the serried lines and thronging cavalry of the Mexicans,
light field-guns had done extraordinary execution. The heavy
artillery, hitherto the more favoured service, saw itself eclipsed.
The First Regiment, however, had already been prominent on the
fighting line. It had won reputation with the bayonet at Cerro
Gordo, and before Mexico was reached there were other battles to be
fought, and other positions to be stormed. A youth with a
predilection for hard knocks might have been content with the
chances offered to the foot-soldier. But Jackson’s partiality for
his own arm was as marked as was Napoleon’s, and the decisive effect
of a well-placed battery appealed to his instincts with greater
force than the wild rush of a charge of infantry. Skilful manœuvring
was more to his taste than the mere bludgeon work of fighting at
close quarters. Two subalterns
were required for the new battery. The position meant much hard
work, and possibly much discomfort. Magruder was restless and
hot-tempered, and the young officers of artillery showed no
eagerness to go through the campaign as his subordinates. Not so
Jackson. He foresaw that service with a light battery, under
1 According to the Regimental Records his company (K) was not
engaged in the battle, but only in the pursuit.
MAGRUDER'S BATTERY 33
a bold and energetic leader, was likely to present peculiar
opportunities; and with his thorough devotion to duty, his habits of
industry, and his strong sense of self-reliance, he had little fear
of disappointing the expectations of the most exacting superior. “I
wanted to see active service,” he said in after years, “to be near
the enemy in the fight; and when I heard that John Magruder had got
his battery I bent all my energies to be with him, for I knew if any
fighting was to be done, Magruder would be ‘on hand.’ ” His
soldierly ambition won its due reward. The favours of fortune fall
to the men who woo more often than to those who wait. The
barrack-room proverb which declares that ill-luck follows the
volunteer must assuredly have germinated in a commonplace brain. It
is characteristic of men who have cut their way to fame that they
have never allowed the opportunity to escape them. The successful
man pushes to the front and seeks his chance; those of a temper less
ardent wait till duty calls and the call may never come. Once
before, when, despite his manifold disadvantages, he secured his
nomination to West Point, Jackson had shown how readily he
recognised an opening; now, when his comrades held back, he eagerly
stepped forward, to prove anew the truth of the vigorous adage,
“Providence helps those who help themselves.”
The American army was delayed long at Puebla. Several regiments of
volunteers, who had engaged only for a short term of service,
demanded their discharge, and reinforcements were slow in arriving.
August 7 It was not until the first week in August that
Scott was able to move upon the capital. The army now numbered
14,000 men. Several hundred were sick in hospital, and 600
convalescents, together with 600 effectives, were left to garrison
Puebla. The field force was organised in four divisions: the first,
under Major-General Worth; the second, under
Major-General Twiggs; the
third, to which Magruder’s battery was attached, under Major-General
Pillow; the fourth (volunteers and marines), under Major-General
Pierce. Four field batteries, a small brigade of dragoons, and a
still
THE VALLEY OF MEXICO 34
smaller siege train1 made up a total of 11,500 officers
and men. During the three months that his enemy was idle at Puebla,
Santa Anna had reorganised his army; and 30,000 Mexicans, including
a formidable body of cavalry, fine horsemen and well trained,2
and a large number of heavy batteries, were now ready to oppose the
advance of the invaders. On August
10 the American army crossed the Rio Frio Mountains, 10,000 feet
above the sea, the highest point between the Atlantic and the
Pacific, and as the troops descended the western slopes the valley
of Mexico first broke upon their view. There, beneath the shadow of
her mighty mountains, capped with eternal snows, stood
The Imperial city, her far circling walls, Her garden groves, and
stately palaces. There lay the
broad plain of Tenochtitlan, with all its wealth of light and
colour, the verdure of the forest, the warmer hues of the great
corn-fields, ripening to the harvest, and the sheen and sparkle of
the distant lakes. There it lay, as it burst upon the awe-struck
vision of Cortez and his companions, “bathed in the golden sunshine,
stretched out as it were in slumber, in the arms of the giant
hills.” On every hand were the
signs of a teeming population. White villages and substantial
haciendas glistened in the woodlands; roads broad and well-travelled
crossed the level; and in the clear atmosphere of those lofty
altitudes the vast size of the city was plainly visible. The whole
army of Mexico formed the garrison; hills crowned with batteries
commanded the approaches, while a network of canals on either flank
and a broad area of deep water enhanced the difficulties of
manœuvre. The line of communication, far too long to be maintained
by the small force at Scott’s disposal, had already been abandoned.
The army depended for subsistence on what it could purchase in the
country; the sick and wounded were carried with the troops, and
1 Two 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and two light pieces.
Ripley’s History of the
Mexican War. 2 It is said,
however, that their horses were little more than ponies, and far too
light for a charge. Semmes’ Campaign of General Scott.
THE VALLEY OF MEXICO 35
there was no further reserve of ammunition than that which was
packed in the regimental waggons. Cortez and his four hundred when
they essayed the same enterprise were not more completely isolated,
for, while the Spaniard had staunch allies in the hereditary foes of
the Aztecs, Scott’s nearest supports were at Puebla, eighty miles
from Mexico, and these numbered only 1,200 effective soldiers. The
most adventurous of leaders might well have hesitated ere he plunged
into the great valley, swarming with enemies, and defended by all
the resources of a civilised State. But there was no misgiving in
the ranks of the Americans. With that wholesome contempt for a
foreign foe which has wrought more good than evil for the
Anglo-Saxon race, the army moved forward without a halt.
“Recovering,” says Scott, “from the trance into which the
magnificent spectacle had thrown them, probably not a man in the
column failed to say to his neighbour or himself, ‘That splendid
city shall soon be ours!’ ” The
fortifications which protected Mexico on the east were found to be
impregnable. The high ridge of El Penon, manned by nearly the whole
of Santa Anna’s army, blocked the passage between the lakes, and
deep morasses added to the difficulties of approach. To the south,
however, on the far side of Lake Chalco, lay a more level tract, but
accessible only by roads which the Mexicans deemed impracticable.
Despite the difficulties of the route, the manœuvre of Cerro Gordo
was repeated on a grander scale.
August 16–18 After a toilsome march of seven-and-twenty
miles from Ayotla, over the spurs of the sierras, the troops reached
the great road which leads to the capital from the south. Across
this road was more than one line of fortifications, to which the
Mexican army had been hurriedly transferred. The hacienda of
San Antonio, six
miles from the city, strengthened by field-works and defended by
heavy guns, commanded the highway. To the east was a morass, and
beyond the morass were the blue waters of Lake Chalco; while to the
west the Pedregal, a barren tract of volcanic scoriæ, over whose
sharp rocks and deep fissures neither horse nor vehicle could move,
flanked the American
CAPTAIN Robert E. LEE 36
line of march. The morass was absolutely impassable. The gloomy
solitude of the Pedregal, extending to the mountains, five miles
distant, seemed equally forbidding; but the engineer officers came
once more to the rescue. A road across the Pedregal, little better
than a mule track, was discovered by Captain Lee.
August 19 Under cover of a strong escort it was rapidly
improved, and Pillow’s and Worth’s divisions, accompanied by
Magruder’s battery, were directed to cross the waste of rocks.
Beyond the Pedregal was a good road, approaching the city from the
south-west; and by this road the post of San Antonio might be
assailed in rear. Overlooking the
road, however, as well as the issues from the Pedregal, was a high
ridge, backed by the mountains, and held by 6,000 Mexicans. Opposite
this ridge the Americans came out on cultivated ground, but all
further progress was completely checked. Shortly after midday the
leading brigade, with Magruder’s battery on hand, reached the summit
of a hill within a thousand yards of the enemy’s breastworks.
Magruder came at once into action, and the infantry attempted to
push forward. But the Mexican artillery was far superior, both in
number of pieces and weight of metal, and the ground was eminently
unfavourable for attack. Two-and-twenty heavy cannon swept the
front; the right of the position was secured by a deep ravine;
masses of infantry were observed in rear of the intrenchments, and
several regiments of lancers were in close support. For three hours
the battle raged fiercely. On the right the Americans pushed
forward, crossing with extreme difficulty an outlying angle of the
Pedregal, covered with dense scrub, and occupied the village of
Contreras. But elsewhere
they made no impression. They were without cavalry, and Magruder’s
guns were far too few and feeble to keep down the fire of the
hostile batteries. “The infantry,” says Scott, “could not advance in
column without being mowed down by grape and canister, nor advance
in line without being ridden down by the enemy’s numerous horsemen.”
Nor were the Mexicans content on this occasion to remain passively
in their works. Both infantry and
CAPTAIN Robert E. LEE 37
cavalry attempted to drive the assailants back upon the Pedregal;
and, although these counterstrokes were successfully repulsed, when
darkness fell the situation of the troops was by no means
favourable. Heavy columns of Mexicans were approaching from the
city; the remainder of the American army was opposite San Antonio,
five miles distant, on the far side of the Pedregal, and no support
could be expected. To add to their discomfort, it rained heavily;
the thunder crashed in the mountains, and torrents of water choked
the streams. The men stood in the darkness drenched and dispirited,
and an attack made by a Mexican battalion induced General Pillow to
withdraw Magruder’s battery from the ridge. The senior subaltern had
been killed. 15 gunners and as many horses had fallen. The slopes
were covered with huge boulders, and it was only by dint of the most
strenuous exertions that the guns were brought down in safety to the
lower ground. A council of war was
then held in Contreras Church, and, contrary to the traditionary
conduct of such conventions, a most desperate expedient was adopted.
The Mexican reinforcements, 12,000 strong, had halted on the main
road, their advanced guard within a few hundred yards of the
village. Leaving two regiments to hold this imposing force in check,
it was determined to make a night march and turn the rear of the
intrenchments on the ridge. The Commander-in-Chief was beyond the
Pedregal, opposite San Antonio, and it was necessary that he should
be informed of the projected movement.
“I have always understood,” says an officer present in this quarter
of the field, “that what was devised and determined on was suggested
by Captain Lee; at all events the council was closed by his saying
that he desired to return to General Scott with the decision, and
that, as it was late, the decision must be given as soon as
possible, since General Scott wished him to return in time to give
directions for co-operation. During the council, and for hours
after, the rain fell in torrents, whilst the darkness was so intense
that one could move only by groping.”
The Pedregal was infested by straggling bands of
CAPTAIN Robert E. LEE 38
Mexicans; and yet, over those five miles of desolation, with no
guide but the wind, or an occasional flash of lightning, Lee,
unaccompanied by a single orderly, made his way to Scott’s
headquarters. This perilous adventure was characterised by the
Commander-in-Chief as “the greatest feat of physical and moral
courage performed by any individual during the entire campaign.”
The night march, although it entailed the passage of a deep ravine,
and was so slow that one company in two hours made no more than four
hundred yards, was completely successful. The Mexicans, trusting to
the strength of their position, and to the presence of the
reinforcements, had neglected to guard their left. The lesson of
Cerro Gordo had been forgotten. The storming parties, guided by the
engineers, Lee,
Beauregard, and
Gustavus Smith, established themselves, under cover of the darkness,
within five hundred paces of the intrenchments, and as the day broke
the works were carried at the first rush.
August 20 Seventeen minutes after the signal had been
given, the garrison, attacked in front and rear simultaneously, was
completely dispersed. 800 Mexicans were captured, and nearly as many
killed.1 The reinforcements, unable to intervene, and
probably demoralised by this unlooked-for defeat, fell back to the
village of
Churubusco, and San
Antonio was evacuated. The pursuit was hotly pressed. Churubusco was
heavily bombarded. For two hours the American batteries played upon
the church and hacienda, both strongly fortified, and after a
counterstroke had been beaten back a vigorous onslaught, made by the
whole line of battle, compelled the enemy to give way. A brilliant
charge of
General Shields’ brigade dispersed their last reserves, and the
whole of the hostile army fled in confusion to the city. The
American cavalry followed at speed, using their sabres freely on the
panic-stricken masses, and one squadron, not hearing the recall,
dashed up to the very gates of the city. Scott’s losses amounted to
1,053, including 76 officers. The Mexican casualties
1 4,500 Americans (rank and file) were engaged, and the losses
did not exceed 50. Scott’s Memoirs.
BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY 39
were 3,000 prisoners, and 3,250 killed and wounded. 37 field-guns
were abandoned, and, a still more valuable capture, a large supply
of ammunition fell into the hands of the victors.
Magruder’s battery, it appears, was retained in reserve throughout
the battle of Churubusco, and Jackson’s share in the victory was
confined to the engagement of the previous day. But his small charge
of three guns had been handled with skill and daring. Magruder was
more than satisfied. “In a few moments,” ran his official report,
“Lieutenant Jackson, commanding the second section of the battery,
who had opened fire upon the enemy’s works from a position on the
right, hearing our fire still further in front, advanced in handsome
style, and kept up the fire with equal briskness and effect. His
conduct was equally conspicuous during the whole day, and I cannot
too highly commend him to the Major-General’s favourable
consideration.” The extreme vigour
with which the Americans had prosecuted their operations now came to
an untimely pause. After his double victory at Contreras and
Churubusco, General Scott proposed an armistice. The whole of the
Mexican army had been encountered. It had been decisively defeated.
Its losses, in men and matériel, had been very heavy. The
troops were utterly demoralised. The people were filled with
consternation, and a rapid advance would probably have been followed
by an immediate peace. But Scott was unwilling to drive his foes to
desperation, and he appears to have believed that if they were
spared all further humiliation they would accede without further
resistance to his demands. The
Mexicans, however, were only playing for time. During the
negotiations, in direct defiance of the terms of the armistice,
Santa Anna strengthened his fortifications, rallied his scattered
army, and prepared once more to confront the invader. Scott’s
ultimatum was rejected, and on September 5 hostilities were renewed.
September 8 Three days later the position of
Molino del Rey,
garrisoned by the choicest of the Mexican troops, was
BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY 40
stormed at dawn. But the enemy had benefited by his respite. The
fighting was desperate. 800 Americans were killed and wounded before
the intrenchments and strong buildings were finally carried; and
although the Mexicans again lost 3,000 men, including two generals,
their spirit of resistance was not yet wholly crushed.
Driven from their outworks, they had fallen back on a still more
formidable line. Behind the Molino del Rey rose the hill of
Chapultepec, crowned by the great castle which had been the
palace of Montezuma and of the Spanish viceroys, now the military
college of the Republic and the strongest of her fortresses. Three
miles from the city walls, the stronghold completely barred the line
of advance on the San Cosme Gate. Heavy guns mounted on the lofty
bastions which encircled the citadel, commanded every road, and the
outflanking movements which had hitherto set at nought the walls and
parapets of the Mexicans were here impracticable. Still, careful
reconnaissance had shown that, with all its difficulties, this was
the most favourable approach for the invading army. The gates of
Belen and San Antonio were beset by obstacles even more
impracticable. The ground over which the troops would advance to
storm the fortress was far firmer than elsewhere, there was ample
space for the American batteries, and if the hill were taken, the
Mexicans, retreating along two narrow causeways, with deep marshes
on either hand, might easily be deprived of all opportunity of
rallying. On the night of the 11th
four batteries of heavy guns were established within easy range. On
the 12th they opened fire; and the next morning the American army,
covered by the fire of the artillery, advanced to the assault.
September 13 In the victory of
Molino del Rey,
Magruder’s battery had taken little part. Jackson, posted with his
section on the extreme flank of the line, had dispersed a column of
cavalry which threatened a charge; but, with this brief interlude of
action, he had been merely a spectator. At Chapultepec he was more
fortunate. Pillow’s division, to which the battery was attached,
attacked the Mexicans in front, while Worth’s division assailed them
from the
BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC 41
north. The 14th Infantry, connecting the two attacks, moved along a
road which skirts the base of the hill, and Magruder was ordered to
detach a section of his battery in support. Jackson was selected for
the duty, and as he approached the enemy’s position dangers
multiplied at every step. The ground alongside was so marshy that
the guns were unable to leave the road. A Mexican fieldpiece,
covered by a breastwork, raked the causeway from end to end, while
from the heights of
Chapultepec cannon of large calibre poured down a destructive
fire. The infantry suffered terribly. It was impossible to advance
along the narrow track; and when the guns were ordered up the
situation was in no way bettered. Nearly every horse was killed or
wounded. A deep ditch, cut across the road, hindered effective
action, and the only position where reply to the enemy’s fire was
possible lay beyond this obstacle. Despite the losses of his command
Jackson managed to lift one gun across by hand. But his men became
demoralised. They left their posts. The example of their lieutenant,
walking up and down on the shot-swept road and exclaiming calmly,
“There is no danger: see! I am not hit,” failed to inspire them with
confidence. Many had already fallen. The infantry, with the
exception of a small escort, which held its ground with difficulty,
had disappeared; and General Worth, observing Jackson’s perilous
situation, sent him orders to retire. He replied it was more
dangerous to withdraw than to stand fast, and if they would give him
fifty veterans he would rather attempt the capture of the
breastwork. At this juncture Magruder, losing his horse as he
galloped forward, reached the road.
The ditch was crowded with soldiers; many wounded; many already
dead; many whose hearts had failed them. Beyond, on the narrow
causeway, the one gun which Jackson had brought across the ditch was
still in action. Deserted by his
gunners, and abandoned by the escort which had been ordered to
support him, the young subaltern still held his ground. With the
sole assistance of a sergeant,
THE CASTLE STORMED 42
of stauncher mettle than the rest, he was loading and firing his
solitary field-piece, rejoicing, as became the son of a warrior
race, in the hot breath of battle, and still more in the isolation
of his perilous position. To stand alone, in the forefront of the
fight, defying the terrors from which others shrank, was the
situation which of all others he most coveted; and under the walls
of Chapultepec, answering shot for shot, and plying sponge and
handspike with desperate energy, the fierce instincts of the soldier
were fully gratified. Nor was Magruder the man to proffer prudent
counsels. A second gun was hoisted across the ditch; the men
rallied; the Mexican artillery was gradually overpowered, and the
breastwork stormed. The crisis of the struggle was already past.
Pillow’s troops had driven the enemy from their intrenchments at the
base of the hill, and beneath the shadows of the majestic cypresses,
which still bear the name of the Grove of Montezuma, and up the
rugged slopes which tower above them, pressed the assaulting
columns. A redoubt which stood midway up the height was carried. The
Mexicans fell back from shelter to shelter; but amid smoke and flame
the scaling ladders were borne across the castle ditch, and reared
against the lofty walls were soon covered with streams of men. The
leaders, hurled from the battlements on to the crowd below, failed
to make good their footing, but there were others to take their
places. The supports came thronging up; the enemy, assailed in front
and flank, drew back disheartened, and after a short struggle the
American colours, displayed upon the keep, announced to the citizens
of Mexico that Chapultepec had been captured. Yet the victory was
not complete. The greater part of the garrison had fled from their
intrenchments before the castle had been stormed; and infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, in wild confusion, were crowding in panic on
the causeways. But their numbers were formidable, and the city,
should the army be rallied, was capable of a protracted defence. Not
a moment was to be lost if the battle was to be decisive of the war.
The disorder on Chapultepec was hardly less than that which existed
in the ranks of the defeated
THE CASTLE STORMED 43
Mexicans. Many of the stormers had dispersed in search of plunder,
and regiments and brigades had become hopelessly intermingled in the
assault of the rocky hill. Still the pursuit was prompt. Towards the
San Cosme Gate several of the younger officers, a lieutenant by name
Ulysses Grant amongst
the foremost, followed the enemy with such men as they could
collect, and Jackson’s guns were soon abreast of the fighting line.
His teams had been destroyed by the fire of the Mexican batteries.
Those of his waggons, posted further to the rear, had partially
escaped. To disengage the dead animals from the limbers and to
replace them by others would have wasted many minutes, and he had
eagerly suggested to Magruder that the guns should be attached to
the waggon-limbers instead of to their own. Permission was given,
and in a few moments his section was thundering past the cliffs of
Chapultepec. Coming into action within close range of the flying
Mexicans, every shot told on their demoralised masses; but before
the San Cosme Gate the enemy made a last effort to avert defeat.
Fresh troops were brought up to man the outworks; the houses and
gardens which lined the road were filled with skirmishers; from the
high parapets of the flat house-tops a hail of bullets struck the
head of the pursuing column; and again and again the American
infantry, without cover and with little space for movement, recoiled
from the attack. The situation of
the invading army, despite the brilliant victory of Chapultepec, was
not yet free from peril. The greater part of the Mexican forces was
still intact. The city contained 180,000 inhabitants, and General
Scott’s battalions had dwindled to the strength of a small division.
In the various battles before the capital nearly 3,000 officers and
men had fallen, and the soldiers who encompassed the walls of the
great metropolis were spent with fighting.1 One spark of
the stubborn courage which bore
Cortez and his paladins through the
hosts of Montezuma might have made of that stately city a second
Saragossa. It was eminently defensible. The churches, the convents,
1 862 officers and men fell at Chapultepec. Scott’s
Memoirs.
THE CASTLE STORMED 44
the public buildings, constructed with that solidity which is
peculiarly Spanish, formed each of them a fortress. The broad
streets, crossing each other at right angles, rendered concentration
at any threatened point an easy matter, and beyond the walls were
broad ditches and a deep canal.
Nor was the strength of the city the greatest of Scott’s
difficulties. Vera Cruz, his base of operations, was two hundred and
sixty miles distant; Puebla, his nearest supply-depot, eighty miles.
He had abandoned his communications. His army was dependent for food
on a hostile population. In moving round Lake Chalco, and attacking
the city from the south, he had burned his boats. A siege or an
investment were alike impossible. A short march would place the
enemy’s army across his line of retreat, and nothing would have been
easier for the Mexicans than to block the road where it passes
between the sierras and the lake. Guerillas were already hovering in
the hills; one single repulse before the gates of the capital would
have raised the country in rear; and hemmed in by superior numbers,
and harassed by a cavalry which was at least equal to the task of
cutting off supplies, the handful of Americans must have cut their
way through to Puebla or have succumbed to starvation.
Such considerations had doubtless been at the root of the
temporising policy which had been pursued after Churubusco. But the
uselessness of half-measures had then been proved. The conviction
had become general that a desperate enterprise could only be pushed
to a successful issue by desperate tactics, and every available
battalion was hurried forward to the assault. Before the San Cosme
Gate the pioneers were ordered up, and within the suburb pick and
crowbar forced a passage from house to house. The guns, moving
slowly forward, battered the crumbling masonry at closest range. The
Mexicans were driven back from breastwork to breastwork; and a
mountain howitzer, which Lieutenant Grant had posted on the tower of
a neighbouring church, played with terrible effect, at a range of
two or three hundred yards, on the defenders of the Gate.
THE CITY OF MEXICO SURRENDERS 45
By eight o'clock in the evening the suburb had been cleared, and the
Americans were firmly established within the walls. To the
south-east, before the Belen Gate, another column had been equally
successful. During the night Santa Anna withdrew his troops, and
when day dawned the white flag was seen flying from the citadel.
After a sharp fight with 2,000 convicts whom the fugitive President
had released, the invaders occupied the city, and the war was
virtually at an end. From Cerro Gordo to Chapultepec the power of
discipline had triumphed. An army of 30,000 men, fighting in their
own country, and supported by a numerous artillery, had been
defeated by an invading force of one-third the strength. Yet the
Mexicans had shown no lack of courage. “At Chapultepec and Molino
del Rey, as on many other occasions,” says Grant, “they stood up as
well as any troops ever did.”1 But their officers were
inexperienced; the men were ill-instructed; and against an army of
regular soldiers, well led and obedient, their untutored valour,
notwithstanding their superior numbers, had proved of no avail. They
had early become demoralised. Their strongest positions had been
rendered useless by the able manœuvres of their adversaries.
Everywhere they had been out-generalled. They had never been
permitted to fight on the ground which they had prepared, and in
almost every single engagement they had been surprised. Nor had the
Government escaped the infection which had turned the hearts of the
troops to water.
September 14 The energy of the pursuit after the fall of
Chapultepec had wrought its full effect, and on September 14 the
city of Mexico was surrendered, without further parley, to a force
which, all told, amounted to less than 7,000 men.2
With such portion of his force as had not disbanded Santa Anna
undertook the siege of Puebla; and the guerillas, largely reinforced
from the army, waged a desultory warfare in the mountains. But these
despairing 1
Grant’s Memoirs, vol. i, p. 169. 2 The total loss in
the battles before the capital was 2,703, including 383 officers.
Scott’s Memoirs.
HIS SERVICES REWARDED 46
efforts were without effect upon the occupation of the capital. The
Puebla garrison beat back every attack; and the bands of irregular
horse men were easily dispersed. During these operations Magruder’s
battery remained with headquarters near the capital, and so far as
Jackson was concerned all opportunities for distinction were past.
February 1848 The peace negotiations were protracted from
September to the following February, and in their camps beyond the
walls the American soldiers were fain to content themselves with
their ordinary duties. It cannot
be said that Jackson had failed to take advantage of the
opportunities which fortune had thrown in his way. As eagerly as he
had snatched at the chance of employment in the field artillery he
had welcomed the tactical emergency which had given him sole command
of his section at Chapultepec. It was a small charge; but he had
utilised it to the utmost, and it had filled the cup of his ambition
to the brim. Ambitious he certainly was. “He confessed,” says
Dabney, “to an intimate friend that the order of General Pillow,
separating his section on the day of Chapultepec from his captain,
had excited his abiding gratitude; so much so that while the regular
officers were rather inclined to depreciate the general as an
unprofessional soldier, he loved him because he gave him an
opportunity to win distinction.” His friends asked him, long after
the war, if he felt no trepidation when so many were falling round
him. He replied: “No; the only anxiety of which I was conscious
during the engagements was a fear lest I should not meet danger
enough to make my conduct conspicuous.”
His share of the glory was more than ample. Contreras gave him the
brevet rank of captain. For his conduct at Chapultepec he was
mentioned in the Commander-in-Chief’s dispatches, and publicly
complimented on his courage. Shortly after the capture of the city,
General Scott held a levée, and amongst others presented to him was
Lieutenant Jackson. When he heard the name, the general drew himself
up to his full height, and, placing his hands behind him, said with
affected sternness, “I don't
Stonewall Jackson SERVICES REWARDED 47
know that I shall shake hands with Mr. Jackson.” Jackson, blushing
like a girl, was overwhelmed with confusion. General Scott, seeing
that he had called the attention of every one in the room, said, “If
you can forgive yourself for the way in which you slaughtered those
poor Mexicans with your guns, I am not sure that I can,” and then
held out his hand. “No greater compliment,” says General Gibbon,
“could have been paid a young officer, and Jackson apparently did
not know he had done anything remarkable till his general told him
so.”1 Magruder could find no praise high enough for his
industry, his capacity, and his gallantry, and within eighteen
months of his first joining his regiment he was breveted major. Such
promotion was phenomenal even in the Mexican war, and none of his
West Point comrades made so great a stride in rank. His future in
his profession was assured. He had acquired something more than the
spurs of a field officer in his seven months of service. A
subaltern, it has been said, learns but little of the higher art of
war in the course of a campaign. His daily work so engrosses his
attention that he has little leisure to reflect on the lessons in
strategy and tactics which unfold themselves before him. Without
maps, and without that information of the enemy’s numbers and
dispositions which alone renders the manœuvres intelligible, it is
difficult, even where the inclination exists, to discuss or
criticise the problems, tactical and strategical, with which the
general has to deal. But siege and battle, long marches and rough
roads, gave the young American officers an insight into the
practical difficulties of war. It is something to have seen how
human nature shows itself under fire; how easily panics may be
generated; how positions that seem impregnable may be rendered weak;
to have witnessed the effect of surprise, and to have realised the
strength of a vigorous attack. It is something, too, if a man learns
his own worth in situations of doubt and danger; and if he finds, as
did Jackson, that battle sharpens his faculties, and makes his
self-control more perfect, his judgment
1 Letter to the author. THE
VOLUNTEERS IN MEXICO 48
clearer and more prompt, the gain in self-confidence is of the
utmost value. Moreover, whether a
young soldier learns much or little from his first campaign depends
on his intellectual powers and his previous training. Jackson’s
brain, as his steady progress at West Point proves, was of a
capacity beyond the average. He was naturally reflective. If, at the
Military Academy, he had heard little of war; if, during his service
in Mexico, his knowledge was insufficient to enable him to compare
General Scott’s operations with those of the great captains, he had
at least been trained to think. It is difficult to suppose that his
experience was cast away. He was no thoughtless subaltern, but
already an earnest soldier; and in after times, when he came to
study for himself the campaigns of Washington and Napoleon, we may
be certain that the teaching he found there was made doubly
impressive when read by the light of what he had seen himself. Nor
is it mere conjecture to assert that in his first campaign his
experience was of peculiar value to a future general of the Southern
Confederacy. Some of the regiments who fought under Scott and Taylor
were volunteers, civilians, like their successors in the great Civil
War, in all but name, enlisted for the war only, or even for a
shorter term, and serving under their own officers. Several of these
regiments had fought well; others had behaved indifferently; and the
problem of how discipline was to be maintained in battle amongst
these unprofessional soldiers obtruded itself as unpleasantly in
Mexico as it had in the wars with England. Amongst the regular
officers, accustomed to the absolute subordination of the army, the
question provoked perplexity and discussion.
So small was the military establishment of the States that in case
of any future war, the army, as in Mexico, would be largely composed
of volunteers; and, despite the high intelligence and warlike
enthusiasm of the citizen battalions, it was evident that they were
far less reliable than the regulars. Even
General Grant, partial
as he was to the volunteers, admitted the superiority conferred by
drill, discipline, and highly trained officers. “A better army,” he
THE VOLUNTEERS IN MEXICO 49
wrote, “man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one
commanded by General Taylor in the earlier engagements of the
Mexican war.”1 These troops were all regulars, and they
were those who carried Scott in triumph from the shores of the Gulf
to the palace of Santa Anna. The volunteers had proved themselves
exceedingly liable to panic. Their superior intelligence had not
enabled them to master the instincts of human nature, and, although
they had behaved well in camp and on the march, in battle their
discipline had fallen to pieces.2 It could hardly be
otherwise. Men without ingrained habits of obedience, who have not
been trained to subordinate their will to another’s, cannot be
expected to render implicit obedience in moments of danger and
excitement; nor can they be expected, under such circumstances, to
follow officers in whom they can have but little confidence. The
ideal of battle is a combined effort, directed by a trained leader.
Unless troops are thoroughly well disciplined such effort is
impossible; the leaders are ignored, and the spasmodic action of the
individual is substituted for the concentrated pressure of the mass.
The cavalry which dissolves into a mob before it strikes the enemy
but seldom attains success; and infantry out of hand is hardly more
effective. In the Mexican campaign the volunteers, although on many
occasions they behaved with admirable courage, continually broke
loose from control under the fire of the enemy. As individuals they
fought well; as organised bodies, capable of manœuvring under fire
and of combined effort, they proved to be comparatively worthless.
So Jackson, observant as he was, gained on Mexican battle-fields
some knowledge of the shortcomings inherent in half-trained troops.
And this was not all. The expedition had demanded the services of
nearly every officer in the army of the United States, and in the
toils of the march, in the close companionship of the camp, in the
excitement of battle, the shrewder spirits probed the characters of
their comrades to the quick. In the history of the Civil War
1 Grant’s Memoirs, vol. i, p. 168. 2 Ripley's
History of the Mexican War, vol. ii, p. 73 &c.)
THE VOLUNTEERS IN MEXICO 50
there are few things more remarkable than the use which was made of
the knowledge thus acquired. The clue to many an enterprise, daring
even to foolhardiness, is to be found in this. A leader so
intimately acquainted with the character of his opponent as to be
able to predict with certainty what he will do under any given
circumstances may set aside with impunity every established rule of
war. “All the older officers, who became conspicuous in the
rebellion,” says Grant, “I had also served with and known in Mexico.
The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the War
of the Rebellion—I mean what I learned of the characters of those to
whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say that all my
movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to
the characteristics of the commander against whom they were
directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected
by this knowledge.”1
Many of the generals with whom Jackson became intimately connected,
either as friends or enemies, are named in Scott’s dispatches.
Magruder,
Hooker,
McDowell, and Ambrose Hill belonged to his own regiment.
McClellan,
Beauregard, and
Gustavus Smith served on the same staff as Lee.
Joseph E.
Johnston, twice severely wounded, was everywhere conspicuous for
dashing gallantry.
Shields
commanded a brigade with marked ability.
Pope was a staff officer.
Lieutenant D. H. Hill received two brevets. Lieutenant Longstreet,
struck down whilst carrying the colours at Chapultepec, was
bracketed for conspicuous conduct with Lieutenant Pickett.
Lieutenant Edward Johnson is mentioned as having specially
distinguished himself in the same battle. Captain Huger, together
with Lieutenants Porter and Reno, did good service with the
artillery, and Lieutenant Ewell had two horses killed under him at
Churubusco. So having proved his
mettle and “drunk delight of battle with his peers,” Jackson spent
nine pleasant months in the conquered city. The peace negotiations
were protracted. The United States coveted the auriferous provinces
1 Grant’s Memoirs, vol. i, p. 192.
LIFE IN MEXICO 51
of California and New Mexico, a tract as large as a European
kingdom, and far more wealthy. Loth to lose their birthright, yet
powerless to resist, the Mexicans could only haggle for a price. The
States were not disposed to be ungenerous, but the transfer of so
vast a territory could not be accomplished in a moment, and the
victorious army remained in occupation of the capital.
Beneath the shadow of the
Stars and Stripes conqueror and conquered lived in harmony.
Mexico was tired of war. Since the downfall of Spanish rule
revolution had followed revolution with startling rapidity. The
beneficent despotism of the great viceroys had been succeeded by the
cruel exactions of petty tyrants, and for many a long year the
country had been ravaged by their armies. The capital itself had
enjoyed but a few brief intervals of peace, and now, although the
bayonets of an alien race were the pledge of their repose, the
citizens revelled in the unaccustomed luxury. Nor were they
ungrateful to those who brought them a respite from alarms and
anarchy. Under the mild administration of the American generals the
streets resumed their wonted aspect. The great markets teemed with
busy crowds. Across the long causeways rolled the creaking waggons,
laden with the produce of far-distant haciendas. Trade was restored,
and even the most patriotic merchants were not proof against the
influence of the American dollar. Between the soldiers and the
people was much friendly intercourse. Even the religious orders did
not disdain to offer their hospitality to the heretics. The uniforms
of the victorious army were to be seen at every festive gathering,
and the graceful Mexicañas were by no means insensible to the
admiration of the stalwart Northerners. Those blue-eyed and
fair-haired invaders were not so very terrible after all; and the
beauties of the capital, accustomed to be wooed in liquid accents
and flowery phrases, listened without reluctance to harsher tones
and less polished compliments. Travellers of many races have borne
willing witness to the charms and virtues of the women of Mexico.
“True daughters of Spain,” it has been said, “they unite the grace
of Castile to the vivacity of Andalusia; and more sterling
LIFE IN MEXICO 52
qualities are by no means wanting. Gentle and refined, unaffectedly
pleasing in manners and conversation, they evince a warmth of heart
which wins for them the respect and esteem of all strangers.” To the
homes made bright by the presence of these fair specimens of
womanhood Scott’s officers were always welcome; and Jackson, for the
first time in his life, found himself within the sphere of feminine
attractions. The effect on the stripling soldier, who, stark fighter
as he was, had seen no more of life than was to be found in a
country village or within the precincts of West Point, may be easily
imagined. Who the magnet was he never confessed; but that he went
near losing his heart to some charming señorita of sangre azul
he more than once acknowledged, and he took much trouble to appear
to advantage in her eyes. The deficiencies in his education which
prevented his full enjoyment of social pleasures were soon made up.
He not only learned to dance, an accomplishment which must have
taxed his perseverance to the utmost, but he spent some months in
learning Spanish; and it is significant that to the end of his life
he retained a copious vocabulary of those tender diminutives which
fall so gracefully from Spanish lips.
But during his stay in Mexico other and more lasting influences were
at work. Despite the delights of her delicious climate, where the
roses bloom the whole year round, the charms of her romantic
scenery, and the fascinations of her laughter-loving daughters,
Jackson’s serious nature soon asserted itself. The constant round of
light amusements and simple duties grew distasteful. The impress of
his mother’s teachings and example was there to guide him; and his
native reverence for all that was good and true received an
unexpected impulse. There were not wanting in the American army men
who had a higher ideal of duty than mere devotion to the business of
their profession. The officer commanding the First Artillery,
Colonel Frank Taylor, possessed that earnest faith which is not
content with solitude. “This good man,” says Dabney, “was accustomed
to labour as a father for the religious welfare of his young
officers, and during the summer
A NEW STANDARD OF LIFE 53
campaign his instructions and prayers had produced so much effect as
to awake an abiding anxiety and spirit of inquiry in Jackson’s
mind.” The latter had little prejudice in favour of any particular
sect or church. There was no State Establishment in the United
States. His youth had been passed in a household where Christianity
was practically unknown, and with characteristic independence he
determined to discover for himself the rule that he should follow.
His researches took a course which his Presbyterian ancestors would
assuredly have condemned. But Jackson’s mind was singularly open,
and he was the last man in the world to yield to prejudice. Soon
after peace was declared, he had made the acquaintance of a number
of priests belonging to one of the great religious orders of the
Catholic Church. They had invited him to take up his quarters with
them, and when he determined to examine for himself into the
doctrine of the ancient faith, he applied through them for an
introduction to the Archbishop of Mexico. Several interviews took
place between the aged ecclesiastic and the young soldier. Jackson
departed unsatisfied. He acknowledged that the prelate was a sincere
and devout Christian, and he was impressed as much with his kindness
as his learning. But he left Mexico without any settled convictions
on the subject which now absorbed his thoughts.
June 12 On June 12, peace having been signed at the end of
May, the last of the American troops marched out of the conquered
capital. Jackson’s battery was sent to Fort Hamilton, on Long
Island, seven miles below New York, and there, with his honours
thick upon him, he settled down to the quiet life of a small
garrison. He had gone out to Mexico a second lieutenant; he had come
back a field-officer. He had won a name in the army, and his native
State had enrolled him amongst her heroes. He had gone out an
unformed youth; he had come back a man and a proved leader of men.
He had been known merely as an indefatigable student and a somewhat
unsociable companion. He had come back with a reputation for daring
courage, not only the courage which glories in swift action and the
excitement of the charge, but courage
A NEW STANDARD OF LIFE 54
of an enduring quality. And in that distant country he had won more
than fame. He had already learned something of the vanity of
temporal success. He had gone out with a vague notion of ruling his
life in accordance with moral precepts and philosophic maxims; but
he was to be guided henceforward by loftier principles than even
devotion to duty and regard for honour, and from the path he had
marked out for himself in Mexico he never deviated. |